This paper provides an explanation of the simultaneous occurrence of large accumulation of external debt, private capital outflow and relatively low domestic capital formation in developing countries. We consider a general equilibrium model in wflich two types of government with conflicting distributional goals randomly alternate in office. Uncertainty over the fiscal policies of future governments generates private capital flight and small domestic investment. This political uncertainty also provides the incentives for the current government to over accumulate external debt. The model also predicts that left wing governments are more inclined to impose restrictions on capital outflows than right wing governments. Finally, we examine how political uncertainty affects the risk premium charged by lenders and how debt repudiation may occur after a change of political regime.
Introduction
In the seventies and eighties, while the public sectors of many developing countries were accumulating large external debts, the private sectors of those same countries were accumulating large external assets.1 The extent of this phenomenon is documented in Table 1 . It is most evident in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Peru and the Philippines. Massive capital outflows also occurred in Peru and Chile in the early 1970s, which are not included in Table 1 (see Ascher (1986) ). In addition, Dornbusch (1986) This paper seeks to explain this apparent form of collective irrationality as the result of political polarization and political instability.
It also suggests why several governments did not attempt to prevent these capital flights, by imposing restrictions on capital outflows, by avoiding sharp appreciations of their exchange rates and by restricting their own public external borrowing. This behavior is explained as the rational response of policyniakers who maximize the welfare of their own constituency or social group as opposed to collective welfare, in economies politically and socially polarized.4
We consider an economy with two groups of agents identified by their productive role: the "workers (wage earners) and the "capitalists" (owners of physical capital and profit earners). The two groups have their own political representatives ("parties") that alternate in office. Although this is a highly stylized characterization of the political arena, it certainly captures some important aspects of the politico-economic structure of 
(3) Sources: (I) Morgan Guaranty Trust (1986) .
recomputed by Cumby-Levich (1987) . Period: 1976-84 (2) 000ley and others (1983) . Period: 1974-82 (3)
Cuddington (1984 developing countries. Each government implements policies that are beneficial for its own group. We consider in particular fiscal policies, even though in a more general setting additional policy instruments could be considered, such as monetary and exchange rate policies.
The purpose of the fiscal policy of the party in office is to redistribute income in favor of its own constituency. Thus, if these policies are sucessful, one should observe that the distribution of income is correlated to the political orientation of the government. Tables 2 and 3, which are based upon different statistical sources, show that this may in fact be the case at least in four countries, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Uruguay.
These countries have been selected from the larger sample of Table 1 Broadly speaking, these tables suggest that ideological polarization has been associated with polarization of redistributive policies. Thus, political uncertainty about the nature of future governments generates economic uncertainty about future economic policies. Private capital flight is explained in this paper as an insurance against the risk of future taxation, as in Khan-Haque (1986) , Eaton (1987) , Eaton-Gersovitz (1987) and Giovannini (1988) . We then show that the desirability of capital controls depends on the political nature of the government: the government representing the capitalist constituency never finds it optimal to impose capital controls; conversely, the government representing the interests of the worker always imposes some restrictions on capital outflows, even if they are binding on capitalists as well as on workers.
Political uncertainty also explains the accumulation of external debt above the social planner's optimum.
Overborrowing occurs if the current government does not fully internalize the future costs of servicing the debt.
Consider, for instance, the case in which both governments tax their opponents at the maximum feasible level in order to redistribute to their own constituency. The government which currently borrows, say the 'capitalist" These results hold even if each government has the option of repudiating the debt inherited by its predecessor. Following Cohen-Sachs (1985) and Sachs (1985) we model reputation costs as a loss to the country's output.7
In addition we consider the possibility that the external assets held by the citizen of the defaulting government may be seized. Note that, since the interest rate demanded by the lenders correctly takes this political risk into account, this paper establishes a precise link between the cost of external borrowing, the risk of debt repudiation and political risk.
The explanation for private capital outflows given in this paper is meant to be a complement (rather than an alternative) to the explanation based upon the risk of expected devaluation of the exchange rate as in Dornbusch (1985) and Cuddington (1985) . We also do not exclude that "policy mistakes" and "mismanagement1, in addition to political instability, may contribute to explain excessive government borrowing and private capital flight as emphasized for instance by, Sachs (1985) , Oornbusch (1986 Oornbusch ( , 1987 and Dornbusch de Pablo (1987) .
The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the model. The main esults of the paper are summarized in the conclusions.
The Model
We consider a small open economy producing one good with two groups of agents, the 'workers and the 'capitalists'. The workers supply inelastically one unit of labor in each period of their life and are prevented from acquiring shares of capital: they cannot become capitalists. The assumption about labor supply can be easily generalized: since the qualitative features of our results remains unaffected we present the simpler case.9
The "capitalists' own the capital stock and hire labor. The production technology of each capitalist is given by a production function:
where: Vt a output in period t; Kt a capital stock at the beginning of period t; Lt a employment In period t. F(.) is homogeneous of degree 1. We set Lt4, so that (1) can be rewritten as:
Letting wt denote the wage we obtain:
where lower case letters denote units per worker. Without loss of generality, we assume that the stock of capital does not depreciate, and k1, the stock of capital at the beginning of period 1, Is exogenously given. The economy lasts two periods.
The qualitative results of this paper can be generalized (at least for some specification of the utility functions) to the infinite horizon case, by using the same dynamic progranmiing solution described in Alesina -Tabellinl (1987) .
The "representative worker" maximizes his expected utility function: c2fl (4) subject to the following budget constraints:
where: c = worker's consumption in period i; 0, taxes on labor income in period i; g 0 government transfers to the worker in period i; b = external assets (tax exempt) held by the worker at the beginning of period 2; ew = tax exempt non-storable endowment available to the worker at the beginning of period 1; r = world real interest rate.
The function u(-) satisfies the usual properties, u'(.) > 0 and u'(.) < 0, plus the Inada conditions. We also assume that the rate of time preference is identical to the interest rate, r, so that: (7) This assumption Is adopted purely for simplicity, to eliminate any additional incentive to borrow or lend other than those which are the focus of the present paper. In particular, this assumption implies that a 'social planner"
would not borrow abroad to redistribute domestic consumption over time.
The "representative capitalist" maximizes his expected utility function:
Using (7) the budget contraints can be written as:
where: x = capitalist consumption in period I; z1 = taxes on capital and capital income; b? = external assets (tax exempt) of the capitalist at the beginning of period i; g 0 government transfers to the capitalist; ec = tax exempt nonstorable endowment available at the beginning of period
The function v(.) satisfies the usual properties, v'(.) > 0 and v(.)< 0, and the Inada conditions.
With no loss of generality we assume that at the beginning of period 1 both workers and capitalists do not have assets or liabilities abroad, i.e., b=b=0.
However, both workers and capitalists have a positive tax exempt endowment.
This makes the first period problem more interesting:
both capitalists and workers have some income which cannot be expropriated and allows them to make investment/consumption decisions. Finally, the case in which workers have no access to international capital markets can be easily addressed as a special case of this model.1'
The government can raise taxes, borrow abroad and make lump sum transfers to its citizens, while lump sum taxes are unavailable. With no loss of generality we assume that there are no public goods to be supplied. We also assume, for simplicity, that the government does not issue domestic bonds. In Section 3 we argue that our results generalize to the case in which the government could choose to borrow domestically. Thus given (7) the budget constraints of the government are:
where d2 = external debt issued by the government in period 1.
Throughout the paper we assume that the government cannot borrow more than a certain amount, d: d2 (13) For the moment, the credit limit d is assumed to be exogenous and identical for the two governments. In Section 6 it is endogenously derived when we explicitly consider the possibility of repudiation: Until then we assume no repudiation.
The government can be of two types: type 'w', that maximizes the workers' welfare (equation (4)); and type 'c', that maximizes the capitalists welfare (equation (10)).
Irrespective of which government is in office in period 1, type c is in office in period 2 with probability P and type w with probability i-p. p is exogenously given throughout this paper. If the country is a democracy, we can interpret this assumption as follows. There are elections at the end of period 1 and the (rational) voters vote for the party which is expected to deliver the highest utility for themselves in period 2.
The distribution of preferences of voters and/or the number of abstentions determines the probabilistic result. Alesina (1988a) and Alesina-Tabellini (1987) show in a related context how to endogenously derive P from the underlying preferences of voters.
If the country considered is not a democracy, P represents the likelihood that, say, type "w" government is overthrown by type "c" government. The likelihood of overthrowing a non democratic government may be affected by current and expected economic outcomes; however this link is not considered in this paper.
PublIc External Debt and Private Capital Flights
First we characterize the behavior of workers and capitalists by solving their optimization problems and taking the government actions as given.
In order to simplify the solution we establish the following result.
If:
then it follows that = g = 0 and z1 1 if type "w' is in office in period i, for i = 1, 2. z = g = 0 and = 1 if type 'c" is in office in period i, for i = 1, 2.
Thus, if the workers are in office they expropriate the capitalists and do not tax labor, and vice versa.
In addition, each government does not make any transfers to its opponents constituency. This result follows from the fact that each government does not attribute any weight to its opponent constituency and from the fact that, ex-post, the taxes of this model are nondistortionary.
The labor income tax is non distortionary because the labor supply is inelastic. The capital income tax is non distortionary ex-post since, in period 2, k2 is predetermined: this is the well known result that the optimal tax or capital is time inconsistent, as discussed in more detail by Fischer (1980) . If the labor supply were elastic, the capitalist government would not choose = 1. The 'c' government would never choose a tax rate in the negative part of the Laffer curve: they would choose the tax rate which maximizes tax revenue; In general, this tax rate lies between zero and 1.
Condition (14) implies that each government is always able to repay its external debt in full without taxing its own group. Otherwise, if in period 2, say, type "c is in office, it sets = 1, g = 0 and z2 equal to the minimum value necessary to satisfy the government budget constraint.
If (14) holds, this value of z2 is zero. Thus, condition (14) is adopted purely for notational simplicity: it does not affect the nature of the results in any respect.
The workers' optimization problem can then be rewritten as follows:
b subject to (5). The first order condition is:
By the Inada conditions on u(.), (17) implies that, if P < 1, then the workers hold some external assets, b > 0.
Using (8) -(10), we can rewrite the capitalists' problem as:
subject to (9). The first order conditions are:
According to (19), if P > 0, then the capitalists hold external assets (b > 0) and the rate of return on domestic capital exceeds the world real rate of interest i.e. (8(1+f'(k2)) > 1).
Thus, political uncertainty generates capital flight and reduces domestic capital formation.
Let us now turn to the governments problem. In the last period the governments optimization problem is very simple. If the type c government is in office it sets z2 = g = 0 and = 1. With the tax revenues it services the debt inherited from the past (if any) and uses the residual to make a transfer to the capitalists (g > 0). The type w government behaves in the opposite way; T2 = g2 = 0, z2 = 1, g > 0.
Let us now consider the problem faced by the 'c" government in period 1.
By using the result just established and by substituting the government's budget constraint into the objective function, we can rewrite the 'c" government problem as follows:
subject to (13) and the private sector's first order conditions, (17), and (19) .
Define as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government borrowing constraint, (13). Appendix 1 shows that the first order conditions of this problem imply:
Using (19a) and (21) it follows that
Thus, if P<1 then y>0 and as a result d2 d. The government is at a corner on its external debt: It would like to borrow more but it Is rationed by the market. Equation (21) The second term on the right hand side of (21), We can summarize this discussion in the following:
Proposition 1:
If 1>P>O, then type c government sets:
d2=, z1=g'=O, '-1, g>O
The capitalists and the workers in turn set: x1>O, b>O, k2>O; c1>O, b>O.
The type "c government borrows from abroad as much as it can, in order to increase current transfers to the capitalists. The latter, in turn, optimally use these transfers to a) increase consumption, b) acquire foreign assets sheltered from fiscal expropriation, c) increase domestic investment.
Thus, in equilibrium, the government borrows from abroad while the private sector acquires foreign assets, despite the fact that they face the same world interest rate.
Note that Proposition 1 hinges on the fact that the two governments are always a corner with respect to tax rates and transfers: for instance, if elected in period 2, the workers government sets z2=1 and chooses g so as to satisfy the government budget constraint. Thus, any change in external debt inherited from the past affects the size of transfers but not the level of taxation, which is always at its maximum. This feature of the equilibrium follows from the extreme preferences of the two governments: they only care about one group, and completely disregard the second group. The same result could also be easily derived from less extreme assumptions about the goverrrent preferences, as long as the political and administrative costs of changing taxes are larger than those of changing the size of the transfers.
(See also Alesina-Tabellini (1987) for some discussion of this point in a related framework).
If the type w government is in office in period 1 it faces the following problem:
subject to (13) and the private sector's first order conditions, (17), (19) and (20).
Appendix 2 shows that, by the same argument used for the type c government, the equilibrium Is characterized by:
Proposition 2 If 1>P>0, the the type w government sets:
d2=, -r1=g=O, z1=1, g'>0
The workers and the capitalists in turn set:
x1>0, b>0, k2>0, c1>O, b>0.
Thus, as in the previous case, the government accumulates as much external debt as it can, and the private sector insures itself against future expropriation by holding external assets. The intuition is also the same as above.
It can be shown (the proof is available upon request) that if the workers had no access to the international financial market (i.e., if we impose the constraint b = 0), then in equilibrium we would obtain d d2>0 (24) The reason is that, if b 0, the workers cannot smooth consumption across time.
Thus, their government would not want to tilt their consumption profile too much:
an excessive public borrowing in period 1 could imply a an excessively low expected consumption in period 2. Thus, the type w government would not necessarily borrow as much as possible in period 1.
Finally, several comparative static results can be established. By applying the implicit function theorem to the first order conditions of the governments' optimization problem, the following results can be proved: flight would still occur in period 1 as an insurance against risk. In addition a "risk premium" would be demanded to hold domestic debt. Since the governments in period 1 are at a corner, in the sense that they would like to redistribute to their constituency as much as they can, they would still borrow abroad up to a (at the risk free interest rate). In addition, they may go beyond this point and issue some domestic debt. Consider instead the case in which a certain amount of domestic debt cannot be expropriated and has to be serviced.
Then up to that level, domestic government debt becomes a perfect substitute of external asset for the public in the first period.
Depending upon the relative magnitude of the "safe" domestic debt relative to the size of the investment in safe assets desired by the public, private agents may hold external assets or external liabilities.
Capital Controls
Suppose that the private acquisition of foreign assets can be constrained by the government in a non discriminatory fashion; namely the constraint must be the same for every individual. Hence, we add the following constraints to the private sector optimization problems:
bq , bq
where q 0 is the limit to foreign assets holding allowed by the government.
Whenever these constraints are binding, the first order conditions of the capitalists can be obtained by solving problem (18) with the additional constraint (25). These conditions are: 27) where n is the (non-negative) Lagrange multiplier associated with (25). The first order condition for the workers (obtained by solving problem (16) with the additional constraint (25)) is:
where n is the (non-negative) Lagrange multiplier associated with (25).
In Appendix 4 it is shown that the type 'c" government chooses d2 = d.
Moreover, this government is always worse off with capital controls, since the controls impose an additional binding constraint on the capitalists optimum problem. The workers are forced to redistribute differently their COnsuoption over time, but this does not affect the capitalists' welfare in any sense.
Hence, the type 'c" government would never choose to impose capital controls.
Capital controls have instead both costs and benefits for the government "w". The costs are due to the additional constraint on the workers problem.
With capital controls, the workers cannot freely increase their savings to offset the government dissavings. On the other hand, capital controls have the effect of forcing the capitalists to invest more domestically.
By applying the implicit function theorem to (26) and (27), it can be shown that ak2 < 0.
Thus, by restricting the access to foreign capital markets, the 'w" government obtains the benefit of a larger domestic capital formation, and a larger tax base in period 2.
These considerations provide the basic intuition for the following result, which is formally proved in section 4 of the Appendix:
Proposition 4 If in the absence of capital controls b > b ,then the 'w" government always imposes capital controls that are binding on both the workers and the capitalists. The "c' government never imposes capital controls.
The level of the controls imposed by the "w" government is a fraction of the workers' degree of risk aversion. If the u(.) function is very concave, then the workers find It very costly to restrict their means of intertemporal consumption smoothing in exchange for a higher domestic capital stock.
In this case even a type "w" would tolerate a substantial amount of capital flight. Conversely, the smaller is the workers' degree of risk aversion, the tighter are the controls imposed by the "WI' type (i.e.: the smaller is q). In the extreme case of risk neutrality, the workers' government would always choose q = 0, thereby completely prohibiting capital outflows. Needless to say, this would also happen in the case in which the workers had no access to the international capital markets (i.e., b = 0).
12
This finding, namely that left wing governments are more inclined to impose capital controls than right wing governments, is probably consistent with the empirical evidence as suggested by Table 5 .
As explained at the bottom of this In Brazil and the Philippines, center left democratic governments have recently been established following a long period of right-wing dictatorships.
It is still early to identify the directions which these two governments will take in terms of capital controls.
Debt Repudiation
Let us assume now that the government has the option of repudiating the debt in the final period. If the government chooses to repudiate, it suffers a loss, which takes two forms. First of all, the country loses a fraction of its national output, as in Sachs (1985) Cohen-Sachs (1985) .13 This loss of income can be justified as the result of retaliation against the defaulting country, such as trade restriction, seizure of public goods (planes, ships, etc.) or the withdrawal of foreign private Investments--(cf. Aizenman (1987) ). Throughout the paper we allow the fraction of income that is lost in the event of a debt repudiation to depend on which government Is in office at the time of the repudiation. Specifically, we denote with e1 the fraction of output lost if the i government repudiates, i=c,w, and we assume that l>ec ew>O This weak inequality is meant to capture the fact that presumably economic and financial exchanges with the rest of the world are more important for the welfare of right wing governments and their constituencies than for socialist governments. Right wing governments may be more likely to rely on foreign investments and foreign trade for the success of their policies than 
which simply implies that the non taxable endowment of the capitalists, ec, is sufficiently larger than the non taxable endowment of the workers, eW.
Under this realistic hypothesis, it is easy to show that in equilibrium the type 'c' government never repudiates. In fact, letting d denote the maximum amount lent by financial markets, in equilibrium we obtain Here in equilibrium neither type repudiates the debt: the government borrows at the risk free rate up to dW and cannot borrow at all beyond this point.
The value of P discriminates between the two cases:
If P is high (32) holds, if P is low it does not. In particular there exists a value of P, say P, for which if P>P case (a) occurs.17
In case (b), in which d = d , the analysis of the previous sections applies almost identically.
Since both governments repay the debt, there is no repudiation risk. Hence, the private sector first order conditions and the optimization problem faced by both government types are identical to those of the previous sections, except in one respect. Namely, here both types take into account that, by increasing k2 and b, they can partially relax their borrowing constraint (since they can shift d ). Under a very plausible condition, this aspect does not make any difference.18 As in the previous sections, both types always borrow as much as they can, setting d2 = d ; see If d2 > d , then the government debt will be repudiated with probability (1-P).
Hence the private sector first order conditions -w for d2 > d are no longer given by (17), and (19) . Instead, for the workers they are: -u'(c1) + Pu(b) + (1-P)(1-)u'(w2÷g + b(1-)) = 0 (33) and for the capitalists they are: 1+f'(k2) )-1)=O (35) Consider the optimization problem faced by the type 'w" government in the interval d2 > ', subject to these new constraints. Section 5 of the Appendix shows that the solution to this problem yields d2 = d. Thus, the -w government of type "w' sets either d2 = d or d2 = d. The same result holds for the uch government (see Appendix). Thus the two governments choose either d or d, depending on which one delivers a higher utility for their constituency. In general this comparison is ambiguous.
If in period 1 the government chooses d, then the debt is repudiated if the "w" government is in office in period 2.
The following proposition establishes the conditions under which repudiation is observed. Thus, this model formalizes the economic effects of political risk, and, for instance, it is consistent with the observation that capital flight are more likely to occur in politically turbulent periods.
We have chosen to present the simplest possible version of the models, to enhance readibility.
However, the qualitative results of the analysis are robust to generalizations of the model in several directions. For instance, the basic results generalize to an infinte horizon model (at least for some functional forms of the utility functions); to a model with an endogenous labor supply; to a model in which the workers are prevented to hold external assets; to a model in which the government provides also public goods; with certain caveats (described in more detail in Alesina-Tabellini (1987) ) to a model in which the preferences of the two governments are less extreme; to a model in which the probability of the change of government is endogenously derived by the underlying preferences of rational voters (see, again, Alesina -Tabellini (1987) and Alesina (1988a) (1985), Cuddington (1985) ).
Third, politico economic considerations crucially affect the choice between "repudiation and "solvency with adjustment". In general different social groups gain and lose depending upon which policy option is adopted. 5. See, for instance, Kaufman (1986) , Haggard (1986) and the references quoted therein. In addition to the political conflict amongst different factor of production, that is the focus of this paper, many of the countries under examination also have a conflict across sectors of the economy (such as agricultural, industrial and comercial). See for instance Sachs (1985) and Frieden (1987) . Incorporating this richer political dimension in the analysis of this paper Is a difficult task, which is left for future research.
6. Related findings are obtained by Alesina-Tabellini (1987) Tabellini- Alesina (1988) and Persson-Svensson (1987) for domestic government debt, in a closed and open economy respectively.
7. This is a highly simplified treatment of repudiation risk, since repudiation costs are given exogenously and not endogenously derived from lender's behavior. For a severe criticism of these models see Gersovitz (1985) ; for a different treatment of external debt repudiation see Grossman-Van Huyck (1986) , Bulow-Rogoff (1987) and .
8. The result that left wing governments are more likely to repudiate the debt is also consistent with the view that the burden of debt repayment falls disproportionately on labor income (as opposed to capital income), as emphasized by Dornbusch (1986) . It is also consistent with the observation that the Soviet Union, China and Cuba repudiated their external debts after their revolutions. Alesina (1988b) discusses related issues for the case of the internal debts of several European countries in the interwar period.
9. "Workers" are prevented from acquiring domestic capital in order to emphasize the difference between the two groups. Alternatively one might capture a difference between "rich" and "poor" due to different endowment rather than by their productive role. This alternative specification has not been explored yet.
10. An alternative specification which leads to qualitatively analogous result would be to have transfers proportional to wages and capital rather than w C lump sum. This would imply to let 0, z 0 and set g1 = 0 and = 0. (The proof is available from the authors). Case (b), which implies that workers cannot borrow abroad, can be easily accounted for. In fact, we show below that in equilibrium we obtain b > 0. Thus, the constraint given in (b) is never binding.
12.
These results about capital controls should be slightly qualified if the labor supply were elastic. In this case the imposition of capital controls on the workers would in general affect both their intertemporal allocation of consumption and leisure. By working through the proof of Proposition 4 it is easy to verify that the result about the workers' government does not change. For the 'c' government the elast'city of leisure with respect to capital controls may reinforce or weaken the aversion to capital controls depending on the utility function of workers (i.e. if capital controls make them work more or less). Sachs (1985) and Cohen-Sachs (1985) we assume that the severity of the "punishment, i.e. he fraction of output lost in case of repudiation, is independent of the amount of repudiation. This feature of the model eliminates partial repudiation as a rational choice. For a more general version of a related model of repudiation in which the extent of the punishment is a function of the amount of debt repudiated see Calvo (1987) .
As in

The case
> ec is less plausible and, in addition, it has the same similar qualitative implications of the case considered in the text as long as b is sufficiently bigger than b 15. In general there are other reasons, besides those considered in the paper, for arguing that the costs of debt repudiation affect differently different groups of the population. For instance, the traded goods and financial sectors are more likely to be harmed than the non-traded goods sectors. Diaz-Alejandro (1984) contains some discussion of these issues.
16. Suppose that (31) were violated: then it must be that d >
Thus,
-c -c -w d carries the risk free interest rate, R(d ) = lie, whereas d carries a risk premium.
If type "c' is in office in period 2 (which happens with -w probability P) and d2 = d , then the debt will be repudiated. Hence, 18. The condition is that ef'(k2) -< 1 . If this conditions is relaxed, it would no longer be true that the1 type 'w sets g = 0. The results concerning government debt are independent of whether or not this conditions holds.
19. Note that here, unlike in Section 3, the size of the debt constraint depends on which government is in office in the first period (via the terms k2 and by).
Diaz-Alejandro Carlos (1987) The type c government optimization problem in period 1 can be written as follows: maximize (20) subject to (13) in the text and to the following first order conditions of the private sector derived in the text as equations (17), (19a) and (19b) respectively.
The government budget constraint has been substituted in 
Proof of Porposition 4
The proof of the statement concerning the 'c' government is immediate. Here we prove the statement concerning the "w" government. Suppose that the capital controls are binding for both groups, i.e., q = b = bw2 and c, w >
The problem of the "w" type can be written as follows:
subject to (26), (27), (28) and (13) be the multipliers associated with these constraints. is the Lagrange multiplier of (13).
The first order conditions of this problem imply: If q b capital controls are not binding for anyone so they do not affect anybody's welfare.
Since the function z(q)is continuous, it follows that it has a maximum for q < q*, that is for a value of q such that the controls are binding on both the capitalists and the workers.
More generally, it follows from (28) in the text that, for a given q, c is smaller the smaller is the concavity of u(.). Hence, the optimal value of q for the 'w" type (i.e., the value of q such that the right hand side of (A.24) is zero) tends in general to be smaller the less concave is u(.). That is, as claimed in the text, the controls Imposed by the 'w' type are stricter the smaller is the concavity of u.
In the limit, if workers are risk neutral, then (28) implies that w = 0.
According to (A.24), If then follows that argmax z(q) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the governments optimization problem for case (b), in which = ". The problem is identical to those of sectthns 1 and 2 of the appendix, except that now = [ef(k2)+,b1 a. Hence the government first order conditions with respect to k2 and b now take into account the effect of k2 and b on d.
Moreover, since government debt here Is treated as a loan rather than as a discount bond, the government now chooses 2 Rd2 = d.
With these changes, the first order conditions of type 'c' are given by Hence the first order conditions must be satisfied at d2 = d.
Repeating exactly the same procedure for the type w' government yields that this type sets d2 dw.
This completes the proof for case (b) of the text, where = . Moreover, it also proves that, in case (a), where d = > neither type would ever set d2 < . Now consider case (a) in the interval d > ', and proceed as in sections 2 and 1 of the Appendix. Suppose that type w is in office in period 1. His expected utility function over this range is: -eb+aPD2)+ePu(b)++s(1-P) u(k2+f(k2) (l_eW)+b(1_)) (A.26) where we used the condition = d2/8P . The constraints are given by (33) Some tedious algebra establishes that A > 0. Hence we obtain a contradiction, and y > 0.
By (A.16)
It then follows that 02 = or that d2 = = d.
Repeating exactly the same procedure for the type c government, we obtain that in the Interval d2 > ?, type c also goes to the corner, by setting d2 ac.
Thus, both types either set d2 = or d2 = d.
A8
In order to see whether or d yields a higher expected utility for the two types, we need to compare the value of the capital shock at d, k2(d), and at ', k('). In general, this comparison is ambiguous. The external assets of the capitalist have a lower expected return at the point than at , since a fraction of them would be seized in the event of a debt repudiation. However, the marginal utility of income for the capitalists is higher in that case.
In other words, the income and substitution effects go in opposite direction, and b can be either higher or lower at a than at
On the other hand, it can be shown that the capitalists always have more at d than at (because of a "Ricardian equivalence argument in the event that type 'c' holds office next period).
For this reason, the case in which k21) k2(a') seems more plausible.
In this case, the type "w" government always goes at d rather than at . Consider for simplicity the case k2() = k2().
If the "w' type borrows up to , it can effect a larger transfer to its constituency than if it borrowed up to '.
Suppose that this extra amount of transfers (d -is spent by the workers in period 1: their utility in period 1 is higher. Moreover, their expected utility in the second period is the same as if the government had borrowed only up to (since, by definition of ', type w is just indifferent between repudiating the debt or repaying i").
If the workers spread the extra transfers optimally across time, their overall utility is even higher. Thus, if k2() = k2() type 'w' is better off at than at .
A fortiori, this is also true if k2() > k2(). Summarizing, if k2() ? k2('), then type 'w' always sets d2 = Consider now type 'c.
Suppose, for simplicity, that = 0 but > 9 It is easy to show that if P is sufficiently high, then d2 = d.
Intuitively, if = 0, the cost of debt repudiation is only born by the government who repudiates. As a consequence, the results of the previous section apply: type c does not fully internalize the costs of issuing government debt, since if it is not reappointed debt repayment or debt repudiation is not costly for him. Moreover, if P is sufficiently close to 1, the interest cost due to the risk premium is negligible.
As a result, type 'c' is better off at d than '. By continuity, this argument also applies if > 0 but small. Conversely, suppose that 8c=8w and is large.
Here, it can be shown that d2 = may be optimal for type c. At d2 = , the interest rate on external debt is higher because of the risk premium. Moreover, the type "c' government suffers a loss if the the debt is repudiated, since some of the capitalists external assets are A9 seized.
It can be shown that, if k2 (3) k2(') this loss always exceeds in real terms the additional resources appropriated through the extra borrowing.
Hence, if k2(d) k2(?), type "c always prefers ' relative to .
If > k2() then the comparison is ambiguous. However, under the hypothesis that 8C = and is large, the solution d2 = aw is more likely.
